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Hromadka: The Price of Protection

THE PRICE OF PROTECTION: COMPENSATION FOR
PARTIAL TAKINGS ALONG THE COAST
Matthew Hromadka
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy made landfall in Atlantic City, New Jersey with winds exceeding 80 miles per hour.1
Enhanced by a cold front sitting off the Northeast Coast of the United
States, the storm took a violent turn directly into the heart of the tristate area.2 As the storm approached, it spanned 485 miles in width,
ultimately causing serious damage in over ten states.3 The impact
was most severe along the coastlines of New York and New Jersey.4
With record storm surges and driving wind and rain, the storm crippled the coastline, sending those in its path into a state of emergency.5 The hurricane was the most powerful of its kind, reminiscent of
the disastrous Great New England Hurricane of 1938, which made
landfall in New York.6
Immediately following the storm, 8.5 million people were


J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. 2011, St.
John’s University. Thank you to my advisor, Professor Rena Seplowitz, for her support and
guidance with this Comment and my law school career. I would like to thank the Touro Law
Review for providing me with this wonderful opportunity. I would especially like to thank
Charissa Schwab, my parents, Frank and Nancy Hromadka, my sister, Katey Hromadka and
my grandmother, Helen D’Alessandro, for all of their love and support.
1
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, FEMA (Oct. 18,
2013), http://www.fema.gov/hurricane-sandy.
2
Matt Daniel, This Date in Science: Hurricane Sandy Hits U.S. Northeast, EARTHSKY
(Oct. 29, 2013), http://earthsky.org/earth/this-date-in-science-hurricane-sandy-hits-u-snortheast.
3
Id.
4
See Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, supra note 1 (discussing the number of residents
affected by Hurricane Sandy and the cost of the damage).
5
Id.
6
Daniel, supra note 2 (discussing how the 1938 hurricane made landfall on Long Island,
N.Y. and southern New England with sustained winds at about 100-120 miles per hour, and
was responsible for approximately 700 deaths).
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without power, and over 23,000 people sought refuge in temporary
shelters.7 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”)
deployed 1,690 officers over the course of a year and provided more
than $1.4 billion in federal aid to survivors of the storm.8 The storm
killed 110 people in the United States, as well as 72 residents in the
Caribbean Islands.9
Hurricane Sandy permanently damaged coastal residences,
businesses, and the shoreline itself.10 For instance, on Fire Island,
New York, the dunes were diminished by 54.5% from their pre-storm
volume and restored to less than 20% of their original size.11 These
dunes have been either entirely destroyed or reduced by as much as
15 feet in height.12 In addition, the important foliage that serves as
the core structure of the dunes was obliterated in many places, weakening the ability of the dunes to withstand future storms.13 The coastline shifted roughly 200 feet, pushing back dunes by as much as 70
feet.14 The beach destruction caused by Sandy was the equivalent of
thirty years of erosion occurring in one single night.15
Coastal communities affected by Hurricane Sandy depend on
dunes to withstand future storms and ongoing erosion.16 Dunes play
an important role in protecting otherwise exposed coastlines from
natural erosion, storm surges, wind, and waves produced by severe
weather systems.17 Although dunes naturally erode over time, storms
such as Sandy increase the rate at which this erosion occurs and hin7

Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, supra note 1.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Wayne Parry, New Jersey Ends Beach Disputes with 1-2 Punch, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 25, 2013, 1:19PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/25/new-jersey-beachdunes_n_3990107.html (discussing Hurricane Sandy’s effects on businesses and coastal residences); Daniel, supra note 2 (discussing the erosion and beach destruction resulting from
Hurricane Sandy).
11
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Hurricane Sandy Eroded Over Half of Fire Island’s Dunes:
New Report Quantifies Coastal Change, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Aug. 28, 11:33:53 AM),
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=3674&from=rss.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Photos Reveal Severity of Hurricane Sandy’s Impact, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?I
D=3452#.Ux08K2eYaM8 (explaining that coastal erosion resulting from the storm was
equivalent to the projected models for a thirty year period).
16
Id.
17
Hurricane Sandy Eroded Over Half of Fire Island’s Dunes, supra note 11.
8
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der the natural replenishment.18
This Comment discusses the various jurisdictional approaches
used when portions of private property are taken in order to conduct
government funded beach re-nourishment programs aimed at combating erosion and restoring lost beach. Section II of this Comment explains the effects of coastal erosion in the area affected by Hurricane
Sandy. Section III examines recovery efforts by federal, state and local governments in response to coastal erosion and Hurricane Sandy.
Section IV assesses the scope of government actions that constitute a
taking along the coast. Section V presents the historical origins of
the fair market value approach for partial takings, which allows certain benefits to mitigate compensation for condemned property. Section VI discusses the case of Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan,19
which adopted the fair market approach of just compensation for
condemned property occurring as a result of a coastal replenishment
program. Section VII examines jurisdictions that use the fair market
value analysis and its variations. Section VIII discusses jurisdictions
that use neither the fair market value approach for partial takings cases nor offset just compensation by benefits realized by public projects. Section IX explores the problems with approaches that exclude
benefits from reducing compensation for property taken by the government in order to protect threatened coastlines.
The United States Constitution, as well as state constitutions,
permit government takings of private property but require just compensation to be paid in return.20 In circumstances along the shore
where property has been taken to protect coastal communities, just
compensation must accurately reflect the cost of the loss. To achieve
such a result, a fair market value approach that considers both the
benefits and detriments to the property owner occurring from the taking yields the most equitable outcome.
II.

THE EFFECTS ON LOCAL COASTAL COMMUNITIES
Hurricane Sandy, the second costliest storm in United States

18

Id.
70 A.3d 524 (N.J. 2013).
20
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.”); see, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.”).
19
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history,21 created overarching economic difficulties for the national
government.22 The federal government has spent roughly $60 billion
on recovery efforts, and this number is certain to rise as a result of
ongoing projects.23 A year following the storm, an additional $1.4
billion in assistance was allocated to roughly 182,000 survivors of the
storm.24 The United States Small Business Administration has provided $2.4 billion in low interest disaster relief loans to revive coastal
industries.25 More than $3.2 billion has been disbursed to state, local
and tribal governments for recovery efforts, as well as $74 million in
Federal Hazard Mitigation Grants.26
Coastal businesses and residents have also experienced overwhelming economic obstacles.27 Businesses in New Jersey suffered a
cumulative loss of $8.3 billion, with over 19,000 businesses losing at
least $250,000 each.28 In New York City, Hurricane Sandy impacted
over 23,000 small businesses, which employed roughly 245,000 people.29 The total cost of damages in New York City was $19 billion.30
In total, 650,000 homes located near the water were destroyed by the
storm.31 The New York City Department of Environmental Protection received $402 million from FEMA in order to rebuild damaged
homes and repair the infrastructure of service facilities, such as waste
and water treatment plants.32
21
Hurricane Katrina was the costliest storm in United States history, causing an estimated
$108 billion in damage. David Porter, Hurricane Sandy was Second-Costliest in US History,
Report Shows, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/2013/02/12/hurricane-sandy-second-costliest_n_2669686.html.
22
Id.
23
Scott Gurian, Tracking the Federal Sandy Aid Money One Year Later, N.J. SPOTLIGHT
(Oct. 19, 2013), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/10/28/tracking-the-federal-sandy-aidmoney-one-year-later/?p=all.
24
Hurricane Sandy: One Year Later, supra note 1.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See Phyllis Furman, Hurricane Sandy, One Year Later: Businesses Struggle to Survive,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 26, 2013, 6:42 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/hurrica
ne-sandy/hurricane-sandy-year-business-article-1.1493143 (discussing the effects of Sandy
on business recovery and local economies).
28
Erik Blake, Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Sandy, NAT’L HURRICANE CENTER
(Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.
29
Furman, supra note 27 (explaining that the majority of businesses were small, employing under 50 employees).
30
Blake, supra note 28, at 18.
31
Id. at 14.
32
A Year After Hurricane Sandy, More Than $2.1 Billion In FEMA Public Assistance
Grants In New York Helps Clear Debris, Reopen Public Facilities, FEMA (Oct. 24, 2014),
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Furthermore, the storm’s geological effects exposed greater
portions of the coastline to storm related damage.33 Hurricane Sandy
caused record storm surges in low-lying coastal areas, with the largest being 13.8 feet in Battery Park, New York.34 The federal government needed to update regional flood maps for the first time since
1983 because of the storm’s permanent alteration of the coastline,
leaving more residents susceptible to damage from erosion.35 According to these new flood maps, New York City’s number of at-risk
residents has doubled since the 1980s.36 Moreover, 67,000 buildings
in New York City are now considered flood prone because of this reconfiguration.37
Hurricane Sandy also impacted the insurance industry for
both property owners and insurance providers.38 Insurance companies providing standard homeowner or property insurance were required to make substantial payments to policy-holders within a very
short window.39 The influx of claims depleted insurer earnings and
revenue.40 Although this did not substantially affect homeowners’
insurance pricing, flood insurance rates have increased significantly
following the storm.41 The National Flood Insurance Program
(“NFIP”) is the primary provider of flood insurance for at-risk residents.42 Prior to the storm, NFIP was already facing financial diffi-

http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2013/10/24/year-after-hurricane-sandy-more-21-billionfema-public-assistance-grants-new.
33
Jill Colvin, FEMA Redrawing City’s Flood Zone After Superstorm Sandy, DNAINFO
NEW YORK (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/20121206/new-yorkcity/fema-redrawing-citys-flood-zone-after-superstorm-sandy.
34
Hurricane Sandy Recovery, NAT’L PARK SERVICES (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.nps.gov/
stli/after-hurricane-sandy.htm.
35
Colvin, supra note 33.
36
Bloomberg Administration, Mayor Bloomberg Announces Results of Flood Insurance
Study Demonstrating New Federal Flood Maps and Rules Will Significantly Increase Costs,
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF NEW YORK CITY (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/344-13/mayor-bloomberg-results-flood-insurance-study-demonstrating-newfederal-flood-maps-and/.
37
Id.
38
Dennis Sebayan, How has Hurricane Sandy Impacted Insurance Rates?, SMARTASSET
BLOG (May 14, 2013), http://www.smartasset.com/blog/housing/how-has-hurricane-sandyimpacted-insurance-rates-2/.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. (stating that although some private lenders offer this coverage, the NFIP comprises
the largest market).
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culties due to $18 billion of debt incurred from Hurricane Katrina.43
Notwithstanding this debt, NFIP has made an additional $7.9 billion
in Hurricane Sandy payments, which has caused flood insurance rates
to soar.44
III.

RECOVERY EFFORTS, BEACH REPLENISHMENT, AND DUNE
RECONSTRUCTION

The federal government has focused on rebuilding residences
and businesses along the shore, while also providing protection from
loss as a result of natural erosion and future storms.45 Unfortunately,
this task has been costly and complicated. FEMA is responsible for
providing aid to state and local authorities, and organizing responses
in the event of a natural disaster.46 In order to expand FEMA’s ability to adequately respond to Hurricane Sandy, Congress enacted legislation which outlined the implementation and funding of reconstruction.
The Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (“SRIA”) was
signed into law on January 29, 2013, coupled with the Disaster Relief
Appropriations Act (“DRAA”).47 This legislation made major
changes to the previous FEMA standards for allocating funds for disaster relief.48 These Acts provide more lenient standards for administering assistance to areas affected by the storm.49 Explicitly, the
SRIA calls for the “[u]se of all or part of the excess grant funds for
cost-effective activities that reduce the risk of future damage, hardship, or suffering from a major disaster and other activities to improve future Public Assistance operations or planning.”50 Among
these activities discussed, dune reconstruction has been one of the
many measures taken to prevent future loss.51
The SRIA and DRAA provide additional federal funding for
43

Sebayan, supra note 38.
Id.
45
Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013, FEMA (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.fema.
gov/about-agency/sandy-recovery-improvement-act-2013.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act, supra note 45.
51
Designing for Flood Levels above the BFE after Hurricane Sandy, FEMA MEDIA
LIBRARY (Apr. 2013), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1537-204908057/fema499_1_6_rev.pdf.
44
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reconstruction along the shore.52 Specifically, the SRIA states:
That $2,902,000,000 of the funds provided . . . shall be
used to reduce future flood risk in ways that will support the long-term sustainability of the coastal ecosystem and communities and reduce the economic costs
and risks associated with large-scale flood and storm
events in areas along the Atlantic Coast.53
These federal funds are used to aid state and local agencies in the recovery process.54 Because beach replenishment programs impose
significant financial burdens on state and local agencies, federal funding is imperative.55 Following the storm, coastal communities have
greatly relied on the receipt of this aid.56
Furthermore, the methods for implementing reconstruction
have been identified in detail in both acts. The SRIA and DRAA designate the Army Corps of Engineers to assess the damage along the
Northeast coast.57 Based upon these assessments, the Army Corps of
Engineers is responsible for designing, coordinating, and executing
reconstruction.58 The SRIA sets forth numerous procedures and
standards that federal agencies must comply with, as well as provisions directed at state and local authorities receiving recovery aid.59
The SRIA even acknowledges potential disputes arising from reconstruction by requiring FEMA to adopt a dispute resolution program.60
Despite the detailed procedures included in both acts, FEMA retains
ultimate discretion over design and implementation of beach replen-

52

Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act, supra note 45.
Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, § 1101 127 Stat 4
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
54
42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2014).
55
Christie Administration Disburses More Than $22.5 Million in Essential Services
Grants To Sandy-Impacted Municipalities, STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICIAL WEBSITE (Oct.
11, 2013), http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/552013/approved/20131011b.html
(discussing the economic ramifications of Sandy recovery efforts on municipal government
agencies).
56
Id. (discussing the budget issues of local townships in New Jersey that faced hardships
providing adequate waste management services, as well as difficulties with continuing employment of local police officers and other public officials because of the excessive cost of
reconstruction following Hurricane Sandy).
57
42 U.S.C. § 5189(f) (2013).
58
Id.
59
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5121.
60
Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act, supra note 45.
53

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 [2014], Art. 16

868

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

ishment efforts.61
Additionally, pursuant to the SRIA and DRAA, FEMA has
provided private contractors with guidelines and methods for rebuilding after the storm.62 The guidelines are designed to encourage private builders to reconstruct the shore in a way that reduces the risk of
future loss from recurring erosion.63 According to FEMA’s report
manual, Designing for Flood Levels above the BFE after Hurricane
Sandy,64 residents in areas with substantial risk for flooding from
beach erosion must take steps to mitigate potential damage. 65 The
report recommends several building methods that substantially reduce the risk of loss for coastal properties.66 Among these methods,
the report suggests raising residences significantly from their previous base level and building structures as far inland as possible within
the property boundaries.67 Furthermore, the report explains that
property owners in affected coastal areas should anticipate zoning
changes as a result of the permanent alteration of the shore, which
may affect the ability to build on shorefront property.68
IV.

THE SCOPE OF TAKINGS ALONG THE COAST

When beach replenishment programs are put into effect, government agencies typically need to take part of coastal property owners’ land to adequately rebuild the shoreline.69 However, what actually qualifies as a “taking” in a coastal context has been a difficult
question. Courts dealing with land disputes along the East Coast endorse the government’s right to take physical portions of private land

61

Id.
Designing for Flood Levels above the BFE after Hurricane Sandy, supra note 51.
63
Id.
64
See id. (explaining that the BFE refers to the Base Flood Elevation, which is the area
that has a one percent chance of being flooded in any given year).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Designing for Flood Levels above the BFE after Hurricane Sandy, supra note 51.
68
Id. (explaining that many areas considered low-risk prior to Hurricane Sandy may experience changes in zoning regulations).
69
See, e.g., Fisher v. Town of Nags Head, 725 S.E.2d 99, 101-02 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012)
(reviewing a beach re-nourishment program that required public takings to implement the
project); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
711-12 (2010) (reviewing a similar project that required the condemnation of coastal property).
62
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along the shore under the takings clause.70
Although it is undisputed that condemnations of physical portions of coastal land are takings and require just compensation, shorefront homeowners have unique property interests that extend beyond
the physical boundaries of their property.71 These special rights are
often infringed by construction along the shore.72 Beach replenishment programs typically eliminate littoral rights to future deposits of
sand and interfere with the right to use and enjoy the foreshore area.73
The courts and state legislatures have interpreted whether these programs qualify as takings.74
State legislatures and judicial proceedings have attempted to
deal with issues regarding residents’ rights to deposits of sand and
their relation to government takings.75 For instance, in Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.,76 the Supreme Court of
Florida was faced with a dispute involving a dune replenishment program along the Gulf Coast of Florida.77 Walton County’s beach replenishment program was carried out as part of a larger scheme endorsed by the Florida legislature.78
The Beach and Shore
Preservation Act enacted in 1961 provides that “beach erosion is a serious menace to the economy and general welfare of the people of
[Florida] and has advanced to emergency proportions.”79 Moreover,
the Act explains that “a necessary governmental responsibility [is] to
properly manage and protect Florida beaches . . . from erosion” and
fund replenishment programs along the coast.80
Under Florida common law, coastal property owners are not
entitled to sudden deposits of sand (known as avulsions), which typically occur as result of a storm or major event that alters the coast. 81
70

John R. Nolan, Symposium, Regulatory Takings And Property Rights Confront Sea Level Rise: How Do They Roll?, 21 WIDENER L.J. 735, 753 (2012).
71
Id. at 747 (discussing coastal property owners’ right to sand deposited over time, otherwise known as an accretion).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 753; see, e.g., Stop the Beach, 560 U.S. 702.
74
See infra note 82 and accompanying text (reviewing whether a Florida legislative policy
properly adjusted littoral rights).
75
See, e.g., id.
76
998 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2008)
77
Id. at 1105.
78
Id. at 1106.
79
FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (2000).
80
Id.
81
Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1114 (“[I]f an avulsion has occurred, the boundary line re-
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Conversely, coastal property owners are entitled to long-term deposits of sand (known as accretions), which typically result from natural
erosion.82 Aside from accretions, littoral property owners have the
right to access, and reasonably use and enjoy an unobstructed view of
the water.83 The Act removed property owners’ common law rights
to future accretions because it allowed government agencies to rectify
all accretion, avulsions and damage from erosion.84
In Walton County, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved the
constitutionality of the Beach and Shore Preservation Act by determining if the legislation deprived coastal land owners of their upland
property rights and rights to future accretions.85 Specifically, the Act
called for surveyors to inspect the Mean High Water Mark
(“MHWM”), and after doing so, to fix an area along that line for
dune construction, known as the Erosion Control Line (“ECL”).86
The government was permitted to deposit sand up to the ECL after it
was designated.87
The property owners claimed that the establishment of the
ECL unconstitutionally deprived them of their littoral rights because
the Act eliminated their interests to future accretions.88 The owners
argued that the denial of future accretions and the temporary denial of
the rights to view, access and enjoy the water constituted a taking and
required just compensation.89 The legislation did not mandate compensation for the interference with these littoral rights.90
The court held that the Act was not a taking and the project
did not violate the property owners’ constitutional rights.91 The court
reasoned that “[l]ike the common law, the Act seeks a careful balance
mains the same regardless of the change in the . . . shoreline.”) (quoting 73 Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts 3d 167 § 3, at 182) (alteration in original).
82
Id. (“[T]he owner of the [upland] loses title to land that is lost by erosion and ordinarily
becomes the owner of land that is added to his land by accretion . . . .”) (quoting 73 Am. Jur.
Proof of Facts 3d § 3, at 182) (alteration in original).
83
Id. at 1125.
84
Id. at 1127.
85
Id. at 1105.
86
Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1108 (explaining the government was permitted to construct only erosion prevention structures “seaward of the ECL”; however, the Act specifically reserved property owners’ rights to ingress and egress, as well as enjoyment of and access
to the foreshore area).
87
Id. at 1107.
88
Id. at 1105.
89
Id. at 1107.
90
Id.
91
Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1120-21.
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between the interests of the public and the interests of the private upland owners.”92 The Act was intended to provide benefits to the general public by preserving beaches while mitigating damages to properties, businesses, and individual homeowners.93 The court upheld
the Act’s provision that sand resulting from government funded renourishment programs is an avulsion and creates no rights in the upland owners.94 Further, because the court found the right to future
accretions was not guaranteed by the common law, this could not be
ruled a taking.95 Also, the property owners still had the rights to access, view, and continued enjoyment the water after the completion
of the project meant their upland interests were not taken.96 The
court relied on Article X, § 11 of the Florida State Constitution,
which serves “to protect Florida’s beaches, part of which it holds ‘in
trust for all the people’”97 to conclude that the Act reflected an appropriate constitutional balance between public and private rights and
the government’s interest in protecting the state’s shore.98
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court
of Florida’s decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,99 which directly aligned
with the holding and reasoning in Walton County.100 The Supreme
Court recognized that private accretion rights were subordinate to the
state’s right to avulsions under Florida common law.101 First, the
Court found that there was no taking because the dunes were constructed along the property line between private and state interests,
92

Id. at 1115.
Id. The court explained that restoring and preserving the beaches from erosion-based
damage served important public “economic, ecological, recreational, and aesthetic interests”
along the shoreline. Id. The Act allowed shore-front property owners to enjoy the benefit of
protection, replenishment of lost beach, as well as protection of existing structures. FLA.
STAT. § 161.088.
94
Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1117-18.
95
Id. at 1120-21 (explaining that the right to accretions was not absolute and is the
equivalent property interest to an easement, which may be suspended or terminated).
96
Id. at 1120.
97
Id. at 1110-11 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11) (referring to the Public Trust Doctrine,
which is a state law doctrine that designates the state as the holder of the foreshore area in
trust for the use and enjoyment of the public).
98
Id. at 1115.
99
560 U.S. 702 (2010).
100
Id. at 733.
101
Id. at 709 (describing the Florida common law that recognized dry land received by an
accretion entitles the property owner to that new land but previously submerged land exposed by an avulsion does not entitle the owner to the newly exposed property).
93
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not physically on the property of the homeowner.102 Further, the project was an avulsion under state common law; thus, the property
owners were not constitutionally divested of their rights to accretions.103 Because there was no exception to the doctrine of avulsion
when the state caused the deposit of sand, there was no taking and no
compensation was required.104
The United States Supreme Court also concluded that the
property owners had no right to direct contact with the water.105 The
owners argued that they possessed a right to have physical contact
with the ocean and that the establishment of the ECL deprived them
of this right.106 The Court explained that because there was no additional littoral right to touch the water, there was no taking. 107 The
denial of contact was not a substantial interference with the littoral
right to access requiring compensation.108 However, in its holding,
the Court explained that if the ECL had been declared upland from
the MHWM, there would be an actual taking of physical property and
compensation would be required.109
Not only have legislatures defined the alteration of littoral
rights in response to replenishment projects, state courts have also determined whether the interference with littoral rights qualifies as a
taking.110 Consistent with the holdings in Walton County and Stop
the Beach, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that land resulting from government-funded avulsion projects did not constitute
takings.111 In City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu,112 the court reviewed a government taking that involved land previously deposited
from a beach replenishment project.113 As part of a redevelopment
plan of commercial areas along the shore, the City of Long Branch
102

Id. at 707.
Id. at 730 (explaining that there is no exception to the doctrine of avulsion when the
state caused the deposit of sand).
104
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 730-31.
105
Id. at 729-30.
106
Id. at 729.
107
Id. at 729-30 (explaining that the owners were claiming a separate right from mere
“access” to the water, the right to “touch” the water). The Act did nothing to substantially
affect the right to “access” the water. Id. at 730.
108
Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U.S. at 730.
109
Id. at 739.
110
See, e.g., City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542, 560 (N.J. 2010).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 545.
103
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moved to take a portion of the Lius’ beachfront property.114 The Lius
owned a small bulkhead located on the shore with a number of businesses.115 The City offered the Lius $900,000 dollars to purchase the
property in order to carry out the project, but the Lius rejected the offer and the government proceeded with an eminent domain hearing.116
The primary issue regarding the eminent domain proceeding
was whether the Lius were the rightful owners of a 225 foot strip of
sand deposited on their land under a beach replenishment project
originating in the 1990s.117 The original deed that the Lius possessed
did not include the nearly two extra acres of beach that had accrued
over the course of the program.118 The court held that this addition to
the Lius’ property was an avulsion, despite the fact that the deposit
occurred over an extended period.119 Therefore, the property owners
were not entitled to compensation.120 The court explained that because the state holds the shoreline in trust for the public sand deposited from government projects is property of the state, not of the
coastal property owners.121
The court reasoned that the Lius enjoyed a protective benefit
from the extra sand because the portion of their property contained in
the original deed was shielded from harmful erosion.122 The benefits
were considered a large compensatory award and justified deeming
such deposits as avulsions.123 This protection allowed the Lius to en114
Id. (discussing the Lius’ compensation for the loss of their ocean front property due to
an increase of 225 feet of beach from the government funded beach restoration project).
115
City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 546.
116
Id. (explaining that at the time of the condemnation proceeding, the court found that
the Lius’ property had been increased over two acres from 1977 to 2010 from previous government funded beach replenishment programs).
117
Id.
118
Id. at 546-47 (referencing previous beach re-nourishment projects initiated by the state
in the mid-1990s which were carried out by the Army Corps of Engineers).
119
Id. at 554 (discussing the presumption of an avulsion rather than an accretion).
120
City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 555.
121
Id.
[U]nder the public trust doctrine, the people of New Jersey are the beneficiaries of the lengthening of the dry beach created by this governmentfunded program. Because the old mean high water mark remains the
boundary line between private and public property, there was no true
loss of land to the Lius or gain to the State.
Id.
122
Id. at 553.
123
Id. at 560.
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joy the use of their property in ways that may not have been possible
without the beach restoration project initiated some years before—to
declare this land to be owned by the Lius would be unjust.124
Judicial and legislative responses to coastal erosion and disputes arising from beach replenishment programs reflect sound policies. Courts have permitted the states to limit the common law right
to accretions in the foreshore area.125 This sacrifice by coastal homeowners is imperative to properly execute protective projects. Legislation such as the Beach Shore Preservation Act, adopted by the Florida
legislature, reflects the important state interest in sheltering the shoreline, and courts have properly supported this interest.126 Moreover,
both the courts and legislatures have balanced common law littoral
rights with the preservation of the state’s interests in replenishing the
shore.
V.

HISTORICAL DEFINITION OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR
PARTIAL TAKINGS: BAUMAN V. ROSS AND THE FEDERAL
PRECEDENT

The federal approach to partial takings was articulated in the
famous Supreme Court case Bauman v. Ross.127 The Court identified
the fair market approach, which considers benefits as offsetting factors when computing the amount for just compensation.128 In Bauman, the United States Supreme Court held that special benefits,
meaning those which are reasonably calculable at the time of the taking, should be considered when determining just compensation.129
The Court stated that the term “just compensation” does not mean the
value of the property taken alone, but rather is an amount that is equitable and just in light of the circumstances of each case. 130 General
benefits, described as those that are conjectural and uncertain to occur, should not be offset from the compensation for a partial taking.131
124

City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 553.
See, e.g., Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1110-11; City of Long Branch, 4 A.3d at 545-46.
126
FLA. STAT. § 161.088.
127
167 U.S. 548 (1897).
128
Id. at 584.
129
Id. at 587.
130
Id. at 569-70.
131
Id. at 561-62, 583-84. The terms “general benefits” and “special benefits” have been
defined differently across jurisdictions following the Bauman holding.
125
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The federal circuit courts of appeal have applied this distinction since the Bauman decision.132 For instance, in United States v.
Fort Smith River Development Corp.,133 the Eighth Circuit was faced
with a partial takings case that involved the River and Harbor Improvement Act.134 The Act, which sought to improve navigation and
riverbank stability along the Arkansas River,135 was a response to recurring flooding and property destruction resulting from the “ravages
of the river.”136 The project required partial takings along the
riverbank, which was, in large part, privately owned.137
In Fort Smith, the government condemned ninety-seven of the
one hundred and sixty acres that belonged to the property owner.138
Originally, in the district court, the government presented evidence
that prior to the taking, the property could only be used for agricultural purposes.139 Following the taking, the property could be used
for industrial activities, which enhanced the value of the remaining
land.140 The district court held that the increase in value was a general benefit and should not offset compensation because all riverbank
properties enjoyed this advantage.141
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and
held that the benefits of riverbank stabilization and the enhanced value of the remaining land should be considered when determining just
compensation.142 Consistent with Bauman, the court held that general benefits are not considered merely because they are enjoyed by
similar surrounding properties.143 The court explained that the benefit of a sustainable riverbank enjoyed by the homeowners was special
because it was, in fact, readily ascertainable at the time of the taking.144 Because the riverbank could now sustain use by industrial ac132
See, e.g., United States v. Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d 522, 525 (8th Cir.
1965); see also Georgia Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land, 596 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir.
1979).
133
349 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1965).
134
Id. at 523.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 524.
137
Id.
138
Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d at 523.
139
Id. at 523-24.
140
Id. at 524.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 527.
143
Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 349 F.2d at 526-27.
144
Id. at 526.
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tivity, the project allowed the homeowners to rezone their property.145
The economic enhancement resulting from the rezoning was obvious,
and not speculative by any means.146 The court articulated the concern that disregarding this valuable improvement could improperly
reflect the loss the property owner experienced.147
The federal distinction between general and special benefits
provides the most effective fair market approach because it focuses
on how the benefits will affect the individual homeowner. The federal approach accounts for benefits that the property enjoys, whether or
not the surrounding community shares them.148 The determination
does not focus on whether the benefits are unique to the property
owner.149 It is fair that benefits, which enhance the value of the property, can be considered as long as they are reasonably certain to occur
and calculable at the time of the taking. Conversely, the federal approach appropriately excludes speculative, conjectural, and indirect
benefits from mitigating compensation, which safeguards a property
owner’s constitutional right to be paid for condemned property.150
This approach accurately represents the actual fair market value of
the taking without under-representing property owners’ interests or
expanding those interests in an inequitable manner.
VI.

THE CURRENT DISPUTE OVER COASTAL PARTIAL TAKINGS:
BOROUGH OF HARVEY CEDARS V. KARAN

The ongoing struggle over the government’s right to reconstruct dunes and replenish erosion-ravaged beaches continues to
spawn litigation.151 Prior to Hurricane Sandy, public works projects
had recently replenished the dunes in response to active storm seasons and recurring erosion.152 Beach replenishment programs typi145

Id. (explaining that the increase was easily computable by assessing the fair market
value of the property based on the sustained use of the land before and after condemnation).
146
Id. at 526.
147
Id.
148
Fort Smith River Dev. Corp., 348 F.2d at 526-27 (quoting United States v. Crance, 341
F.2d 161, 167 (8th Cir. 1965)) (“It is settled that special benefits do not become general
merely because other lands in the area [of the taking] are similarly benefited.”).
149
Bauman, 167 U.S. at 583-84.
150
Id. at 569.
151
See, e.g., Fisher, 725 S.E.2d at 101 (reviewing a beach re-nourishment program that
required public takings to implement the project); see also Stop the Beach Renourishment,
560 U.S. at 707.
152
See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526 (discussing an eminent domain
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cally involve partial takings of coastal property, which require just
compensation to be paid by the government agency to the property
owner.153 However, there is a great deal of uncertainty among jurisdictions as to what constitutes just compensation.154
In The Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, the New Jersey
Supreme Court clarified the calculation of just compensation while
resolving a dispute regarding a beach replenishment program administered in 2008.155 The Borough of Harvey Cedars (“Borough”) was
required to secure easements from coastal property owners for a federal and state funded dune construction plan.156 The plan sought to
replenish the beach and construct twenty-two foot high dunes along
the coast.157 The project was to be carried out over fifty years with
replenishment occurring every five to seven years.158 The Borough
acquired a majority of the easements necessary; however, some residents refused to grant the government access.159
The Karans160 did not provide a voluntary easement to the
Borough because they claimed that the project would eliminate their
ocean view and result in loss in value and enjoyment of their property.161 Nevertheless, the Borough acquired the necessary easement
from the Karans through a condemnation proceeding pursuant to its
power of eminent domain.162 The government appraiser found the
dispute regarding a beach re-nourishment program implemented in 2008).
153
See, e.g., id.
154
Compare In re City of New York, 83 N.E. 299, 303 (N.Y. 1907) (explaining that benefits to the remaining property may not be offset against the compensation award absent statutory authorization), with Fisher, 725 S.E.2d at 196 (explaining that benefits may offset compensation for partial takings).
155
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526-27.
156
Id. at 527-28. The Army Corps of Engineers designed and carried out the project in
conjunction with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Id. at 528.
157
Id. at 527 (explaining that the project was implemented by pumping “massive amounts
of sand on the beach to extend the shoreline seaward 200 feet” and constructing a dune wall
the entire length of Long Beach Island).
158
Id. at 530.
159
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 528.
160
The Karans owned property along the shoreline in the affected area. Id. The Karans’
home was estimated at $1.9 million, but, despite agreement on this fact, both the Borough’s
and Karans’ experts disagreed over the value of the property after the condemnation. Id. at
530.
161
Id. at 530 (discussing the Karans’ theory, which was based on the notion that the elimination of the oceanfront view would greatly diminish the desirability of their home on the
market and destroy the unique nature of their oceanfront property).
162
Id. at 526. In April 2009, the Superior Court, Law Division affirmed the eminent domain power of the Borough and appointed commissioners to inspect the property and assess
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condemned property to be worth $300 based on the loss of their
ocean view.163
The Karans disputed this amount as just compensation for the
taking at the condemnation trial.164 They argued that the loss of the
ocean view was substantial and would decrease the fair market value
of the home because the property would essentially become “a second-row home” instead of oceanfront property.165 The Borough argued that the dune wall would actually benefit the Karans’ property
and that any economic loss resulting from the taking would be supplemented by the protection the dune wall would provide.166
The Karans countered this position by relying on New Jersey
State common law which only allowed certain benefits to mitigate
just compensation.167 Similar to Bauman, the common law approach
distinguished between general and special benefits, by stating that the
latter may only be used to offset the compensation for a partial taking.168 Furthermore, like the definition used by district court in Bauman, the term “general” referred to benefits that were shared by surrounding properties, as well as the individual whose property was
partially taken.169 However, this definition deviates from the Bauman
explanation of general benefits given by the Supreme Court. The
New Jersey common law offset “special” benefits, defined as being
unique to the property owner, not shared by other adjacent property
owners.170 This definition also differed from the Bauman explanation
of special benefits.
The lower court adopted the common law approach and held
that the benefits the dune wall provided were general and should not
be considered when calculating just compensation.171 The Borough
presented testimony that the dune wall was a special benefit given by
the value to be paid for just compensation. Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 530. Interestingly, these commissioners found $300 was adequate compensation without visiting the
property. Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. (discussing the Karans’ expert witness who valued the loss around $500,000 based
on a comparative sales analysis).
166
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 531.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 536.
169
Id. at 537 (explaining the complicated development of the “general” and “special” distinction over the course of New Jersey’s legal history).
170
Id.
171
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 531.
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an Army Corps of Engineers civil engineer who specialized in coastal
management.172 The expert testified that the defendants’ property
had a 56% chance of total loss within a thirty-year period without the
dune construction.173 The expert explained that the project enhanced
the residence’s expected lifetime by 200 years.174 Further, the
Karans’ property only had a 27% chance of surviving the next fifty
years without sustaining any storm damage if the project was not implemented.175 Despite these statistics, the lower court considered the
dune wall a general benefit because inland properties, as well as the
Karans’ shorefront property, were protected.176 The court neglected
to consider the varying degrees of protection afforded to properties
located at different distances from the ocean, and the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the Karans for $375,000.177
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey overturned the
lower court and held that the calculation of just compensation for a
partial taking is determined by the fair market value of the property.178 This rule was a departure from earlier cases and abandoned the
equation used by the lower courts.179 The court explained that the
previous distinction between general and special benefits misinterpreted the Bauman distinction and that all benefits that were calculable at the time of the taking could be used to offset the damages.180
The court articulated that special benefits are those that are calculable, non-conjectural and quantifiable at the time of the taking.181
General benefits, described as those that are “speculative to occur in
the indefinite future,” could not offset compensation.182
The Supreme Court of New Jersey explained that the lower

172

The expert was assigned through his position at the Army Corps of Engineers to assess
the storm protection benefits the replenishment project would create. Id. at 529.
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 531 (relying on expert testimony, which explained that within a fifty year period,
the Karans had a 73% chance of sustaining significant or total loss without the project).
176
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 531.
177
Id. (excluding from the jury’s consideration not only benefits the project produced, but
also the Borough’s expert testimony that the loss of ocean view was not substantial because
the expert himself had never experienced the vantage point from the Karans’ deck).
178
Id. at 544.
179
Id. at 542-43.
180
Id.
181
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 542-43.
182
Id.
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court improperly defined special and general benefits.183 The lower
court deemed general benefits as those shared by other property owners, but this directly conflicts with the definitions provided in Bauman.184 This misinterpretation led the lower court to improperly exclude the benefits derived from the Karans’ dune wall.185 The court
examined the extensive history of the New Jersey common law application that was originally based on the Bauman decision.186 It concluded that the development of the common law approach involved
an incorrect understanding of general and special benefits as articulated by the Supreme Court.187 The holding in Borough of Harvey
Cedars corrected this misapplication and aligned the new partial takings approach to properly represent the Bauman distinction.
VII.

THE FAIR MARKET APPROACH: CONSIDERATION OF
BENEFITS
A.

The South Carolina Approach

Consistent with the federal and New Jersey approaches, South
Carolina has also endorsed a fair market value assessment that considers reasonably calculable benefits.188 In Wilson v. Greenville
County,189 the Supreme Court of South Carolina abandoned the old
standard for just compensation that did not consider benefits enjoyed
by surrounding properties.190 Like the original New Jersey common
law used by the lower court in Borough of Harvey Cedars, the previous South Carolina calculation classified special benefits as those that
are unique only to the property owner and not shared by the commu-

183

Id. at 541.
Id.
185
Id. at 544.
186
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 535-38 (explaining that the general versus special distinction originated in response to the railroad industry boom in the nineteenth century). Many rail companies escaped compensation because general assertions of benefits allowed any damages to be offset, permitting the rapid expansion of railways across the United
States. Id. at 536.
187
Id. at 544 (discussing “shorthand” definitions applied by courts to the terms general
and special, which caused deviations in the words’ meanings envisioned by Bauman).
188
Wilson v. Greenville Cnty., 96 S.E. 301 (S.C. 1918).
189
96 S.E. 301 (S.C. 1918).
190
Id. at 304 (explaining that the term “compensation” incorporates a balancing of interests, mainly benefits and loss or damage).
184
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nity as a whole.191
In Wilson, the court reviewed the partial condemnation of the
homeowners’ property in order to construct a public highway. 192 The
government argued that the taking enhanced the value of the property
owners’ land, which should be considered as an offsetting factor for
compensation.193 The property owners relied on the state common
law and claimed that any benefit derived from the highway project
was general because it was mutually shared by surrounding properties.194 They argued that this general benefit should be excluded
when computing the damages.195
The Supreme Court of South Carolina stated that compensation could not be adequately determined without consideration of
“the manner, purpose, and effect of the taking upon the remainder, in
so far as these produce benefit[s] as well as loss[es] and damage[s],
and if the former exceeds the latter, just compensation has been
made.”196 The court deemed this method to be the most effective and
relied heavily upon the federal precedent in Bauman.197 The highway
enhanced the individual property owners’ land in a unique way that
differed from the effect on surrounding property and should be considered for compensation.198
Similar to the reasoning in Borough of Harvey Cedars, the
court explained that the benefits of the project to the individual property owner could be both general and special based on the common
law distinction.199 However, this fact should not have excluded the
benefits from consideration.200 The court explained that the degree of
benefits varies based on the proximity to the highway. 201 The closer
the property was to the highway, the greater the economic enhancement.202 The court concluded that the benefits were not general be191

Id. at 303.
Id. at 302.
193
Id.
194
Wilson, 96 S.E. at 303.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 304.
197
Id. (citing Bauman, 167 U.S. at 548) (referring in its holding to the “rule adopted by
the Supreme Court of the United States and a majority of the states, and . . . the approval of
most eminent text-writers.”).
198
Id.
199
Wilson, 96 S.E. at 303.
200
Id. at 304.
201
Id. at 303.
202
Id. at 303.
192
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cause all adjacent lands were similarly advantaged and that the enhanced value of the property was directly realized to the owner and
reasonably calculable at the time of the taking.203
The fair market approach identified in Wilson was clarified by
a later decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court, which also involved a partial taking for road construction.204 In Smith v. City of
Greenville,205 the court explained that the applicable state constitutional provision allowed benefits to be considered for just compensation.206 The power of eminent domain provided by the South Carolina Constitution permitted the state to delegate the power to local
authorities and municipalities.207 Inherent in this delegation power
was the authority to proscribe the manner in which the condemning
entity could calculate just compensation.208 State legislation, which
outlines proceedings that allow benefits to be offset, properly permits
the condemning authority to do so within state constitutional standards.209 This approach views the condemned land and remaining land
“as a whole,” and all injuries and benefits must be incorporated into
the calculation.210
The South Carolina approach endorses the fair market value
assessment identified in Bauman.211 The Smith decision solidified
this approach through state constitutional support and expanded the
application of the fair market doctrine.212 The reasoning behind this
approach was best described by the court in Smith as, “award[ing]
203

Id.
Smith v. City of Greenville, 92 S.E.2d 639, 643 (S.C. 1956).
205
92 S.E.2d 639 (S.C. 1956).
206
Id. at 643;
Moreover, the ‘just compensation’ to which the landowner is entitled
under Article I, § 17, is compensation for the taking, and not for the land
taken. In this view of the matter the land is considered as a whole, and
the landowner’s damage the diminution of its value by reason of the public work.
‘The just compensation required by the constitution to be made to the
owner is to be measured by the loss caused to him by the appropriation.
He is entitled to receive the value of what he has been deprived of, and
no more.
Id. at 645.
207
Id. at 643.
208
Id.
209
Smith, 92 S.E.2d at 644.
210
Id. at 645.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 643.
204
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him less would be unjust to him; . . . award[ing] him more would be
unjust to the public.”213
B.

The Florida Approach: A Limited Fair Market
Approach

Like the federal approach and the New Jersey and South Carolina approaches, Florida has endorsed the fair market value analysis
but has limited it when only an easement has been taken under certain
circumstances.214 For example, in Cordones v. Brevard County,215
the court applied the fair market analysis when the County acquired
an easement over privately owned coastal property.216 The case involved a beach re-nourishment program that was funded by the state
of Florida and locally sponsored by Brevard County.217 The County
secured shorefront easements that would be used once every six years
to construct dunes and replenish lost beach.218 An aggrieved property
owner, who refused to grant an easement, challenged the resulting
condemnation action.219 Specifically, the homeowners challenged the
valuation of the property before and after the easement was condemned because the county assessor used a fair market value approach.220
The court upheld the valuation of the easement as proper under Florida law for partial takings.221 The appraiser examined the
property taken for the easement and found it was not exclusively controlled or accessed by the owners and could not be developed due to
existing state regulations.222 Because of these two factors, the valua213

Id. at 645.
Cordones v. Brevard Cnty., 781 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
215
781 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
216
Id. at 523-34.
217
Id. at 521.
218
Id. (explaining that the exact nature and frequency of beach re-nourishment projects
are dictated by necessity, and securing an easement that lasts over a long period of time is
paramount to implementing the most effective erosion control measures).
219
Id. There were three claims by the property owners: that “Brevard County failed to
establish [the] necessity for the easement[],” that the court approved an easement of unlimited duration, and that the valuation of the partial taking was improper. Cordones, 781 So.
2d at 521.
220
Id. at 523.
221
Id. (explaining that the case was remanded due to the court’s agreement with the property owner’s claim on appeal that the original easement needed to fall within a fifty year period).
222
Id. (relying on the appraiser’s explanation at the condemnation proceeding that the
214
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tion was based primarily on the “potential density of development for
the upland property.”223 The court found this method appropriate,
explaining that the value was “expressed as the difference between
the market value of the land free of the easement and the market value of the land burdened with the easement.”224 Further, the county
appraiser considered a sales comparison and “income approach” to
all upland properties in the area and derived a fair market value from
these methods.225 The court held that this adequately represented the
loss to the property owners.226 Although it was never argued that
benefits should not be offset, the court explained that the “value of an
easement cannot be ascertained without reference to the dominant estate to which it is attached.”227 This implies that when assessing just
compensation, the court must consider the effect the taking has on the
remaining property.
However, the court in Cordones explained that the fair market
value approach should not be used in all situation228 The court articulated that the fair market valuation should not be used when the
property interest was not “unique, none of the improvements on the
property had been displaced, and the taking involved only an easement.”229 These limitations exclude benefits when the condemning
entity acquires an easement, the project does not affect the improvements by the homeowner, and other property owners share the benefits of the project.230 In essence, the fair market value approach is
compromised in the area of coastal disputes because beach replenishment programs typically involve easements.231 Thus, the Florida
approach may reach a different outcome than the federal, New Jersey,

public regularly used the portion of sand taken to access the foreshore).
223
Id.
224
Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 523.
225
Id. at 524
226
Id.
227
Id. at 523-24.
228
Id.
229
Cordones, 781 So. 2d at 523-24 (relying on an Indiana state court decision that outlined this distinction but did not refer to any Florida precedent on this point).
230
Id. This distinction is problematic for coastal takings because many projects do not
affect the improvements, involve easements and create benefits for the community as a
whole. Due to this, benefits almost certainly will not offset damage awards in a coastal setting.
231
See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 541 (explaining the municipality
needed to secure easements over private property); see also Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1108
(discussing easements acquired by the municipality for beach re-nourishment).
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and South Carolina fair market analyses would.
VIII. THE EXCLUSION OF BENEFITS FOR JUST COMPENSATION
A.

The New York Approach: Distinguishing between
Land Taken and Remaining

The New York partial takings approach does not allow benefits to be considered for the remaining land.232 However, both general and special benefits can mitigate compensation for the land taken, which is consistent with the previously discussed fair market
value approaches.233 Despite this similarity, the New York approach
specifically rejects the Bauman precedent for reducing compensation
for partial takings.234 This policy allows property owners to receive
compensation for their condemned land without considering the enhanced value of the remaining land caused by the taking.235 Simply
put, New York courts disregard the purpose of the taking and only
look at the portion of land acquired by the government entity. Unlike
the fair market value approach, New York distinguishes the land remaining from the land taken.236 This distinction undermines the
Bauman precedent because the benefits property owners enjoy from a
partial taking affect the remaining land, not the condemned property.
In Chiesa v. State,237 the New York Court of Appeals reiterated this policy and held that the benefits enjoyed by property owners
whose land was taken could not offset the damages award for the entire taking.238 In Chiesa, the property owners owned a 193-acre plot
of land of which twenty-two acres were taken to construct a new interchange for a thruway.239 The taking increased the property value
to the remaining land.240 The court citied Bauman and discussed the
232

Chiesa v. State, 324 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1974).
See, e.g., In re City of New York, 83 N.E. 299.
234
Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d. at 331-32. This approach requires two proceedings for a taking:
one for the land taken, and one for the remaining land. Id. at 332. In operation, this “dual”
proceeding requirement does not allow compensation for the remaining land to be offset by
the benefits generated by the condemned property. Id.
235
Id. at 331-32.
236
Id. (discussing the Bauman decision and the precedent it has set regarding partial takings).
237
324 N.E.2d 329 (N.Y. 1974).
238
Id. at 331.
239
Id. at 330.
240
Id. (explaining that the theory of enhancement in value was based on the fact that the
233
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Supreme Court’s reliance on early New York decisions to endorse
this federal partial takings policy.241 Although this may have been
the case, the New York Court of Appeals distinguished the current
case from the earlier decisions in New York that appeared to support
consideration of benefits.242
The New York Court of Appeals explained that the early decisions statutorily permitted the exercise of eminent domain by the
state and required dual proceedings to account for surrounding properties.243 In each of the earlier cases, statutory authority allowed special and general benefits to offset damages for the remaining land but
not for the actual damage award of the condemned land.244 The court
explained that benefits to the remaining property could never offset
the compensation for the taking.245 In effect, this approach will not
consider the protection the dunes provided for the remaining property. The Court of Appeals ultimately held “that in no case should an
award be made for less than the value of the property actually taken
by condemnation.”246
The support for the New York approach relies upon the state’s
power to tax and the placement of the burden of payment on the state
and the taxpayers, not the individual who lost property.247 In Chiesa,
the court expressed serious concern about situations where the state
would be able to generally assert benefits to the remaining land to
offset the damages for the property taken and escape the constitutional requirement for just compensation.248 The court had similar worries that benefits that exist at the time of the taking may be discontinued, eliminating any benefit that was subtracted for the taking.249

closer proximity to the Thruway would cause an increase in the demand for the property).
241
Id. at 331.
242
Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d at 332.
243
Id.
244
Id.; see, e.g., Livingston v. City of New York, 8 Wend. 85 (N.Y. 1831) (explaining that
this case involved “dual” proceedings, which permitted the state to assess benefits as an offsetting factor through statutory provisions).
245
Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d. at 333.
246
Id. at 332.
247
Id.
248
Id. (describing the situation where the state could offset both general and specific benefits against the remainder and how this would be an “arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of
the State’s power of taxation.”).
249
Id.; see also In re City of New York, 83 N.E. at 299 (describing the dangers of offsetting benefits to the remainder when the benefit was not guaranteed to last in perpetuity, thus
becoming a false gift).
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Essentially, the court was apprehensive about the offsetting of benefits against the award, and the state’s abandoning the use of the property, stripping the property owner of just compensation. Moreover, it
appears that the court believed the state bore the burden of paying for
public projects through its power to tax. The reasoning was that the
property owner already paid for the project through his or her taxes
and that reducing the compensation award would be additional payment for the project that other owners (who did not have property
condemned by the government) were not required to make.250
B.

The Minnesota Approach: Excluding Benefits
Shared by Adjacent Property

The Minnesota partial takings law follows an approach similar to the recently overturned New Jersey common law that distinguishes between general and special benefits on the basis of uniqueness to the property owner. In State by Lord v. Hayden Miller Co.,251
the Minnesota Supreme Court explained that:
When part of a tract is taken by eminent domain, the
owner is entitled to the difference between the market
value of the tract immediately before the taking and
the market value of what is left after the taking, excluding from consideration general benefits and deducting from the difference special benefits.252
On its face, this test aligns with the Bauman and Borough of
Harvey Cedars decisions; however, the classification of general and
special benefits differs, resulting in significantly different outcomes.
The dispute in this case involved a condemnation proceeding for part
of the property owners’ land that was taken for the reconstruction of a
local service road of an interstate highway.253 At the center of the
dispute was the lower court’s instruction to the jury explaining general and special benefits.254 The actual meaning of these terms
250

Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d. at 332.
116 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 1962).
252
Id. at 537.
253
Id. at 536.
254
Id. (explaining that the main contention by the state in the case was that the frontal access to the road enhanced the property value, while the property owners contended this actually conferred a greater detriment and should increase the damages award for the partial taking).
251
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caused confusion and the municipality disputed the award on the
ground that the jury did not consider the adequate amount of special
benefits.255 The court rejected this argument, stating that the jury was
permitted to offset special damages, as it saw fit, not that it was required to make this determination.256 Like the lower court in Borough of Harvey Cedars, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on the
idea that general benefits are those that are shared by the surrounding
community and are not idiosyncratic to the condemned property
owner.257 If adjacent property owners shared any benefits realized
from the new highway, benefits could not offset compensation.258
The Minnesota approach is identical to the lower court’s
analysis in Borough of Harvey Cedars. Both approaches limit the
consideration of benefits unless the property owner is the sole beneficiary. Minnesota still adheres to the partial takings analysis that was
criticized by the New Jersey State Supreme Court.
IX.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF EXCLUDING BENEFITS FOR
COMPENSATION
A.

The Windfall Threat

The New York approach, which excludes all benefits to the
remaining land, fails to reflect the true loss for partial takings along
the coast. This approach disregards the policy purposes behind beach
replenishment programs. The importance of rebuilding the shore for
coastal communities has been emphasized in the wake of Hurricane
Sandy.259 These programs are not an inconvenience for coastal residents—they are a necessity. By excluding all benefits conferred upon the remaining land, there is great potential for windfall judgments
for property owners.260 In many cases, if government agencies did
not undertake dune replenishment, private homeowners would be left
funding such efforts themselves. Aside from providing much needed
protection, significant maintenance and sustainability costs for
255
Id. at 537-38 (describing trial court decision where the jury was told that if it believed
the frontal access was in fact a special benefit it may be deducted, but it was up to the jury
members to make that finding).
256
State by Lord, 116 N.W.2d at 538.
257
State by Mattson v. Colon, 194 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Minn. 1972).
258
Id. at 580.
259
Sandy Recovery and Improvement Act of 2013, supra note 45.
260
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 541.
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coastal owners have been reduced as well.
In Chiesa, Judge Jasen dissented, explaining the threat of
windfall judgments in favor of individual property owners if calculable benefits were not offset.261 This windfall threat was also a driving
factor in the Borough of Harvey Cedars decision.262 Judge Jasen
supported the Bauman approach because otherwise property owners
receive two forms of compensation: the benefit of the project and a
greater damage award because those benefits did not lower the payment for condemned land.263 This point cannot be more telling when
beach replenishment disputes arise. There seems to be no sound reasoning in the New York approach to overlook the fair market value
when it is ascertainable at the time of the taking.
Likewise, the Minnesota approach, similar to New York’s,
has the potential for windfall judgments for property owners. Because special benefits must be distinct to the property owner, it is extremely likely that benefits produced by beach replenishment programs would be considered general. Thus, like New York, the
protection provided by replenished dunes would be entirely excluded
from consideration. Once again, this result is inequitable and overcompensates property owners.
Jurisdictions that disregard the benefits of protective public
work projects allow coastal residents to enjoy protection from near
certain loss for free. Shoreline property owners would need to fund
similar beach nourishment projects themselves, absent the impressive
responses by federal, state and local governments. Instead, tax generated revenue, which comes directly out of the public’s pocket, provides funding for the projects that directly benefit front row coastal
owners.264 With long-term plans of government-funded replenishment, coastal owners’ remaining property continues to receive these
benefits free of charge into the indefinite future.

261

Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d at 334 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 541.
263
Chiesa, 324 N.E.2d at 333 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
264
See About the Agency, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/about-agency (last visited May 2,
2014) (reviewing the history of FEMA dating back to 1979, when President Carter signed an
executive order creating the agency, which then became a federal administrative body funded by tax revenue).
262
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The Confusion of the General versus Specific
Distinction

The distinction of benefits based upon uniqueness to the individual property owners is not useful in cases involving beach replenishment programs. In Borough of Harvey Cedars, the lower court
struggled when applying the original state approach which was similar to the New York and Minnesota view.265 The case became focused solely on whether the dune wall was a benefit to the Karans’
property in a unique manner or in a way that was mutually enjoyed
by the entire community.266 In fact, the dune wall provided both a
general and special benefit as defined by the New Jersey common
law.267 Thus, the common law distinction was arbitrary in this circumstance.
This dispute is a clear indication of the inefficiencies of the
New York and Minnesota approach. The very nature of the claim
concerned an arbitrary distinction that resulted in significantly different outcomes.268 Coastal protection projects undertaken by government agencies serve a multitude of purposes.269 Distinguishing the
difference between these purposes is not only difficult, but it is also
irrelevant for determining the value of loss to the individual owner.270
Statistically, coastal properties have a much greater chance
and degree of destruction or loss in the event of a natural disaster or
periodic erosion.271 Although these projects are designed with the intention of providing broad protections for entire coastal communities,
ultimately beachfront properties are directly benefited because of the

265

Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 526.
Id. at 526.
267
Id.
268
Id. at 533.
269
See N.J. Beach Replenishment Programs Underway in Monmouth Towns, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Jan. 3, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.nj.com/monmouth/index.ssf/2014/01/nj_beach_
replenishment_work_to_start_in_monmouth_towns.html (discussing the benefits of beach
replenishment providing protection against erosion, tidal surge, periodic flooding, and structural damage).
270
See Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 539 (explaining that the distinction is “difficult even for trained legal minds.”).
271
Jeff Waters, RMS: Insight and Observations of a Superstorm, PROPERTY CASUALTY
360 (Oct. 30, 2013), http://m.propertycasualty360.com/2013/10/30/rms-insight-andobservations-of-a-superstorm (explaining the repercussions of Hurricanes Katrina, Ike and
Sandy on coastal insurance and property law and the heightened risks following these major
natural disasters).
266
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heightened risk of loss associated with living directly on the shore.272
As the lower court decision in Borough of Harvey Cedars demonstrated, maintaining the common law distinction between general and
special benefits seriously complicates the process of compensating
property owners and leads to an undesirable legal conflict.273 Instead,
calculable and ascertainable benefits should be accounted for because
this is a logical approach that is quantifiable and easier to apply.
C.

Justifications for Excluding Benefits Fail to
Materialize Along the Coast

Although the ultimate justifications for prohibiting the consideration of benefits for the remaining land have merit, they are not
applicable in a coastal context. The concerns raised in Chiesa, regarding the possible discontinuation of the benefits derived from
government projects, are not relevant in the coastal situations discussed in this Comment. Each of the beach re-nourishment projects
presented, ranging from Florida to New Jersey, stipulated for a prolonged management of the condemned property. The projects were
implemented with a long-term plan for continued assessment and replenishment that would allow for a sustainable shoreline. Because
these projects are constantly ongoing as the coastline changes, there
is no need to be concerned with whether the project will continually
provide the benefits being used to reduce compensation.
Moreover, the policy concerns behind approaches that exclude benefits shared by adjacent properties are not relevant in a
coastal setting. The Supreme Court of Minnesota explained it is not
fair that partially condemned property owners suffer a loss and a benefit from public projects, but adjacent properties enjoy the same benefit without losing a portion of their land.274 However, as explained
by the Borough’s expert in Borough of Harvey Cedars, the threat of
loss is remarkably heightened for property located immediately on
the shore compared to property located two and three rows inland.275
Despite the shared benefits of these projects, the tangible benefits for

272

See, e.g., Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 529 (citing the Borough’s expert report showing that the coastal property owners only had “a 27% chance of” avoiding any loss
over a fifty year period).
273
Id.
274
State by Mattson, 194 N.W.2d at 579.
275
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 529.
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first row homeowners are significantly greater and directly enhance
shoreline properties’ sustainability.
X.

CONCLUSION

The fair market value approach set forth in Borough of Harvey Cedars establishes the most effective method of valuing partially
taken property along the coast.276 As the New Jersey Supreme Court
held, “just compensation should be based on non-conjectural and
quantifiable benefits, benefits that are capable of reasonable calculation at the time of the taking.”277 Computing compensation without
accounting for these benefits awards coastal property owners windfall
judgments “at the public’s expense” that are “above the fair market
value.”278
When the remaining property is safer and more secure, paying
exorbitant amounts in return for inconvenient beach access or the loss
of an ocean view does not reflect the value of the land before and after the taking. As the court in Borough of Harvey Cedars explained,
potential buyers will certainly value the view of the ocean, however
“a rational purchaser would place a value on a protective barrier that
shielded his property from partial or total destruction.”279 Simply put,
compensation should be reflected as the “quantifiable decrease in the
value of [the] property—loss of view— . . . set off by any quantifiable increase in its value—storm-protection benefits.”280
The ultimate price of protection can only be represented by
considering all effects of dune re-nourishment programs for coastal
properties. Beach replenishment projects directly benefit shoreline
property owners more extensively than adjacent inland property.
This tangible property interest cannot be ignored when computing
just compensation for partially taken shorefront land.

276
277
278
279
280

Id. at 543.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 542, 543.
Id. at 541.
Borough of Harvey Cedars, 70 A.3d at 544.
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